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This paper provides empirical evidence on the joint determinants of child labor and
child schooling using individual level data from Egypt. The main findings are as follows: (i)
A 10% increase in the illiterate male market wage decreases the probability of child labor by
21.5% for boys and 13.  1% for girls. (ii) Higher local regional income inequality increases the
likelihood of child labor. (iii) Parents who were child laborers themselves are more likely to
send their children out to  work. (vi) Local labor market conditions- the share of adults
engaged in the public sector or in non-regular jobs- play an important role in influencing
child labor participation. (iv) There is a trade-off between child labor and child schooling.
The results suggest that not only is poverty the main cause of child labor, but that child labor
perpetuates poverty as well.
Keywords: child labor, schooling, developing countries, wages, poverty.
JEL: 120,130, J13, J20, 015.Foreword
This is an important paper and one of the first econometric studies of child labor in
the Middle East and North Africa Region where data availability often poses a constraint in
analyzing labor market outcomes and household behavior.  The author uses individual data
from Egypt and finds that adult wages have a strong negative influence on the probability of
child labor but there are significant gender differences which depend on whether, first, it is
the father's or mother's wage that changes and, second, whether the child worker is female of
male.  Higher local income inequality in a province/region increases the likelihood of child
labor while parents who were child laborers themselves are more likely to send their children
out to work.  Thus, not only is poverty the main cause of child labor, but child labor itself
contributes to the perpetuation of poverty.  While the paper explores a series of effects, one
worth mentioning is  that  there  seems to  be  a  trade  off  between child labor  and  child
schooling.  Three implications of the paper are the  following.  First, policies aimed  at
alleviating poverty and reducing income inequality are crucial in tackling child labor and
breaking the cycle of poverty transmission from one generation to the next.  Second, policies
need to  take  into  account gender  differences in  patterns  of  child labor  and  effects of
interventions. Third. improving adult employment, in particular creating more formal sector
jobs, seems to facilitate the reduction of child labor.
Zafiris Tzannatos
Leader
Global Child Labor ProgramDo Market Wages Influence Child Labor and Child Schooling?'
The  most  recent  estimates  by  the  World  Bank  and  the  Intemational  Labor
Organisation indicate that there  are about 250 million children, less than  14 years old,
working world-wide. 2 Many of these children work long hours under hazardous conditions,
and  all  of  them  are very  low  paid.  The current unprecedented public  concern for the
prevalence of child labor has brought broad consensus on the need to eliminate child labor by
international organisations such as the ILO and the World Bank. 3 However, there is a wide
disagreement on the best way to achieve that, and on whether banning child labor is likely to
be effective in eradicating this phenomenon- see for example, Siddiqi and Patrinos (1995). A
recent notable theoretical paper by Basu and Van (1998) shows that a ban on child labor can
worsen the conditions of households in very poor countries where households rely on child
income for their survival. Their model is based on the assumption that household will only
send its children to work if its income from non-child labor is very low - the luxury axiom.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence has consistently failed to demonstrate a strong relationship
between household poverty and  child labor - for most recent examples, see Ray (2000),
(1999) and Nielsen (1998).
The aim of this paper is to test and further understand the determinants of child labor
and especially, the influence of low market wages. The paper provides empirical evidence on
the impact of low market adult and child wages on child labor using an individual level data
set,  and also allowing for two new contributions to the child labor literature: the impact of
local regional income (non-labor) inequality on child labor, and the influence of having
parents who were child laborers themselves- the inter-generational transmission of poverty
through the experience of child labor.
Basu & Van (1998) assume that parents send their children to work only if they are
poverty stricken; they take for granted parental altruism towards the child. Thus, in their
model, poverty, or low adult wage, is the main reason for sending children to work- the
' I am grateful to Barry McCormick for helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Sally
Srinivasan,  Yves Zenou and participants at ESRC DESG Annual Conference,  Reading, July 1999.
2 See Fallon and Tzannatos (1998). Basu (1999) provides a summary of participation rates for children under 15
years old in selected LDCs.
See ILO(1997) and Fallon and Tzannatos (1998).
Iluxury axiom. In addition, they also assume in productive activity, adult labor and child labor
are substitutes- the substitution axiom.  They conclude that if a labor market is characterised
by more than one equilibrium - one in which adult wages are low and children work, and
another where adult wages are high and children do not work- banning child labor is a benign
policy. But, in very poor countries, where there is only one labor market equilibrium at which
adult wages are low, banning child labor can worsen the households' welfare.  Hence, they
argue that promoting adult employment is the first best policy to eliminate child labor.
The notion that wages, both adult and child, affect the supply of, and the demand for,
child labor is not new. Earlier studies which examine the influence of adult and children
wages on labor market participation rates of children 4  - such as Rosenzweig & Evenson
(1977), Rosenzweig (1981), Levy (1985), and Skoufias (1994) - use regional aggregate data
and focus on the determinants of the number of children (fertility rate) as well as their quality
(school participation rate and labor force participation rate) at the rural district or village
level. 5 However, evidence from these studies  which use  aggregate data is  inconclusive.
Rosenzweig & Evenson (1977) using district level data from rural India in the  1960s, find
that both adult male and female wages have negative significant impact on boys and girls
working. On the other, Skoufias (1994) using data from rural India as well but for the 1970s,
find  that  adult  wages do  not  have  a  significant influence on  the  probability  of  child
participation in either the labor market or schooling.  Levy (1985) using data from rural
Egypt, though not distinguishing between boys and girls, shows that higher adult male wages
have positive significant effect on child labor, while adult female wages have negative one. 6
Recent studies using micro data sets- for example, Jensen & Nielsen (1997), Nielsen
(1998),  Patrinos  and  Psacharopoulos  (1997),  Grootaert  (1998),  and  Canagarajah  and
Coulombe (1997) and Ray (1999)- do not examine the effect of adult market wages on child
4  Bhalotra & Heady(1998) use child market wages to explain  hours of child work in rural Pakistan and Ghana.
Early analvsis of child labor - for example, Rosenzweig & Evenson (1977), Rosenzweig (1981), Levy (1985)-
focuses on the economic role & contribution of children by modelling household behaviour. These models of
time allocation within the household explain simultaneously family size (fertility), school enrolment and child
labor. Rosenzweig & Evenson (1977) provide the basic model in this literature analysing the joint  family
decision regarding the number of children and children's time allocated to schooling and work and show that
Indian families have many children as a result of the high return to the use of child labor.
6  Diamond & Fayed (1998) using a flexible form production function show that adult male labor is
complement to child labor, while adult female labor is substitute to child labor in Egypt.
2labor, though they study the impact of household poverty on child labor.' Yet, the results of
the individual level data are mixed as well. Ray (1999) tests the luxury axiom, of Basu and
Van, on  Peru &  Pakistan by examining the relationship between child  labor hours and
household poverty. He studies the likelihood of poor households (those earning below the
poverty line) sending their children to work, and finds mixed evidence; a positive significant
relationship between household poverty and child labor in the case of Pakistan, but not in the
case of Peru. In addition, Nielsen (1998) finds that in the case of Zambia, poverty and low
income have very  small effect on the probability of  child labor, and  she concludes that
poverty is not the main cause of child labor in Zambia. Canagarajah  & Coulombe (1997) also
find that household welfare has a weak effect on the probability of child labor, but in Ghana.
Thus, the first focus of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence using individual
level data on the impact of poverty on the probability of child labor, but also using market
wages (adults and child).
The second focus is to study the influence of unequal regional income distribution
which  Swinnerton & Rogers (1999) hypothesise to be  an important determinant of child
labor. Swinnerton & Rogers (1999) extend the model by Basu & Van and show that child
labor would also exist if non-labor income were not equally distributed among households -
the distribution axiom. They argue that more equal income distribution would reduce child
labor. Recent econometric work tend to study the impact of household poverty on child labor
by using welfare index - per capita expenditure- or more commonly the size of household
landholding';  no  attempts  have  been made  to  capture the  impact. of  regional  income
inequality. This paper examines the influence of being in a province/region where income
(non-labor) is unequally distributed on the probability of child participating in the labor force
using regional Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality.
Although  one would like  to study the effect  of household  income  on the probability  of child labor,  one can
argue  that  household  income,  in  this case,  is endogenous,  i.e. household  income  is affected  by child  labor;  how
much the other members  of the household  work and earn is affected  by whether  children  are working  or not.
This is why studies tend to use household consumption  or expenditure  instead of household income.
Unfortunately,  we don't have any data on consumption  or expenditure.  Hence,  this is a  limitation  in our
analysis,  though  we examine  the effect  of market  wages,  inequality,  and  whether  the parents  were child  laborers
themselves,  all of which  can be interpreted  loosely  as measures  of income.
3The third focus of the paper is to  investigate in a  new way the transmission of
poverty, or low income, from parents to children. There is no empirical evidence on how
child labor perpetuates poverty from one generation to another, or on how parents who were
child laborers are more likely to have their children work as well. One might argue that
parents who worked as children are more likely to  have under-invested in schooling and
become poverty trapped  and  hence  would expect  their  children to  work as  well.  The
relationship between family background, such as race, ethnic origin, religion and in particular
education, and child labor is fairly established in the empirical literature. 9 Studies show that
low  level  of  parents'  educational  attainment  is  an  important  factor  in  increasing  the
likelihood of children  working. However, the  effect of the parents being  child laborers
themselves has not  been explored in the  literature previously.  In this  paper, the inter-
generational transmission of low incomes or poverty is explored by testing whether parents
who themselves worked as child laborers are more likely to send their children out to work or
not.
Although Basu &  Van (1998) do not model  school participation, in many cases,
schooling and employment for children are not mutually exclusive. Many children work and
attend school. In fact, many children have to work to go to school; otherwise thev could not
afford to go to school. This underscores the fact that child labor and schooling may work
together in many cases." 0 In many developing countries, due to limited financial resources
mainly school buildings, public schools operate two or three shifts schedule school day (4
hours each approximately). Thus, in a way the educational system seems to accomm  odate for
the dual activities of children."' Thus, this paper explores the joint determination of child
labor and child schooling and will assume that these two decisions facing a child - whether
to work or to study- are two interdependent choices. The paper uses a unique data set from
8  Lack of  data on household expenditure or  landholdings prevent including these measures of  household
poverty as well in this paper.
9 See Grootaert and Knabur (1995) for a review of this literature.
10 The fact that children may be working and going to school at the same time may affect their  educational
attainment is beyond the scope of this study,  but is important.
"  Many educational systems in LDCs are organised into shifts, for example. Bangladesh - Ravallion nad
Wodon (2000), Peru -Patrinos & Pscaharopoulos (1997) and Eeypt - Hanushek & Levy (1993).
4Egypt that is nationally representative and covers 10,000 households and more than 10,000
children.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of child
labor in Egypt. Section 3 presents the econometric model used. The main determinants of
child  labor and  school  participation are  reported in  Section 4.  The main  findings  are
summarised in the Conclusion.
2.  The Data
This  study uses individual level  data from the  1988 Labor Force Sample Survey
carried out by the Central Agency for  Public Mobilisation and  Statistics (CAPMAS) in
Egypt. The October 1988 round of the LFSS is a nationally representative survey covering
10,000 households. The survey collected detailed information on employment and socio-
economic characteristics of individuals 6 years of age or more. It also  included a set  of
questions on child labor.' 2 The analysis is based on 10742 children aged between 6-14 years
old for whom full information on schooling, labor participation & parents characteristics are
available.
A child is classified as a worker or economically active, by the International Labor
Organisation (ILO), if the child is remunerated for that work, or if the output of this work is
destined for the market."3  This definition is also adopted here. Hence a child is considered to
be working whether he/she is being paid for work or is working for his/her family and is
unpaid for that work. The survey uses the previous year as its reference period. There is no
data on household chores activities carried out by those children.
Egyptian labor law stipulates a minimum age for employment of 12. However, this
legislation does not apply to family businesses, domestic work or agriculture. On the other
hand, in Egypt as in many other developing countries - such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, Costa
Rica" 4 - the minimum working age is lower than the required age of compulsory education
which is 15 years.
12 See  El  Deib  (1994)  for  detailed  discussion  of the  child  labor  module.
3 See Basu (1999) for a detailed discussion.
4 Siddiqi and Patrinos (1995).
5Table la  presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of children between 6-14
years old. The first column provides the characteristics of all children in the sample. Columns
2 & 3 show the characteristics of school participants and non-school participants.  First, the
school non-participation rate is 17.5% for the total sample of  6-14 years old. Almost two
thirds of school non-participants are girls. Although, 60 % of children in the sample are rural
residents, 83.5 % of children who are school non-participants are rural children. In addition,
the majority of school non-goers tend to come from families where the parents have no, or
very  little, education. About 40  % of  children who are not  engaged in  schooling have
dropped-out of school. Another interesting difference between children who are enrolled in
schooling and those who are not, is that only 13.9% of children who are not attending schools
have at least one overseas return migrants in their household compared to  17 8% among
children who are attending school.
Columns 4 - 7, in Table la. display the characteristics of working and non-working
children. A distinction is made between children who are paid and those who work for the
family and are unpaid laborers though their output is destined for the market- columns 5 & 6.
Column 4 shows that 42 % of all working children are less than 12 years old - 6-1 1 years old-
, and that, 61 % of all working children are boys. Three-quarters of working children are
engaged in agriculture. Around 30 % of working children are waged workers.' 5 Parents of
children who are not working are on average more educated than those of working children.
16.6% of children in female headed households are working for wage, while onlv 10.93 %
work for non-wage. More than half (58%) of the working children come from families where
the fathers were child laborers and 42% where the mothers were child laborers. Although 32
% of the fathers of the sampled children are employed in the Public Sector, only 17 % of the
fathers of working children are employed in the public sector.
More than half the working children (57%) are also attending school" 6 - Table lb. On
average, children work 5.28 hours per day and 57% of working children reported working 7
'5 In developing countries where agriculture is a major sector, the majority of working children tend to work in
subsistence agriculture as unpaid family workers. For example, more than 90 % of the working children are
wage workers in most sub-Saharan African countries- see Canagarajah & Coulombe (1997).
16 In Ghana. for example, 19 % of the total number of  children  work & study; 66% of children who were
working were also going to school; see Canagarajah & Coulombe (1997).
6days a  week." 7 Table  Ic  presents the  child labor and  schooling participation pattern of
children by gender, rural/urban region and age groups. First. 7.93 % of children are not
engaged in neither market work nor in attending schooling. This group is comprised mainly
of girls (83 %) who are most probably involved in household chores.  Secondly, 10.63% of
all children in the 6-14 years old cohort combine working and studying. Work and study
combination is more common among boys, among 12-14 years old and in rural areas. The
proportion of boys who tend to combine working and studying is greater than the proportion
who only works. The majority of children in urban areas are enrolled in schooling and only
3.29% work and do not go to school. Many Egyptian public schools operate up to three shift
schedule (4 hours each approximately) a day  - morning, afternoons and early evenings -
mainly due to  government resource constraints. Thus, in a way the Egyptian educational
system seems to  accommodate for the dual activities of children. Thus, in the Egyptian
context, it seems appropriate to examine the joint determinants of both attending school and
working.
3.  The Econometric Model
This paper aims to explore the main determinants of child labor and child schooling
in  a reduced  form model by  focusing on the  influence of market  wages, local  income
distribution and perpetuation of inter-generational poverty. The estimation method used here
reflects the decision making process. Schooling and work are not treated as two independent
decisions  nor  as  a  sequential process." 8 It  is  assumed  that  these  two  decisions  are
interdependent and a bivarite probit model is used because it allows for the existence of
possible correlated disturbances between two decisions. Bivarite probit models also allow us
to test for the existence and significance of the interdependence  of these joint decisions.
17 Data  on children's  working  hours  and  working  days are only  available  for 1377  children  and  not for the total
sample  of working  children  (N=  1988).
18  Canagarajah  and Coulombe  (1997) and Nielsen (1998 also use bivarite probits. Different estimation
techniques,  of the determinants  of the probability  of child working  and the probability  of child schooling,  are
used in recent  studies  to capture  the decision  making  process:  Patrinos  and Psacharopoulos  (1997)  and Jensen
& Nielsen (1997) assume  that the two decisions  are independent  and therefore  use logit models;  Grootaert
(1998) uses a sequential  binary probit model where a certain hierarchy  of choices is assumed  to capture  a
sequential  decision  making  process.
7Let  Z  i I  represent the decision of working and  Z i 2  the decision of schooling.
The general specification of a two-equation model would be
Zjl  =  I'xiI  +  e  ,  i I  =  1 if  z 1 >  0,  y  0  otherwise
Z2  X=  i2  +  -i2'  =  1 if  Zi2  >  01  Yi2 =  0  otherwise
E[  i ] =  E[i 2]  =  0
Var  [£i  ]  Var  [  2 ]  =
Cov  [  £  il,  c  i2  P
where p  is  the  coefficient of  correlation  between the  two  equations.  The first
dependent variable is defined I if the child is economically active in the labor market and 0
otherwise. The second dependent variable is defined 1 if the child participates in schooling
and  0 otherwise.  x,,  and  x,2are the  explanatory variables explaining the probability of
working and  the probability of  attending schooling respectively. In  what follows, these
explanatory variables are examined.
3.1  Market  WVages
One of the primary aims of this paper is to  test for whether there  is a  negative
relationship between adult wages and child labor as conjectured by Basu & Van (1998).
According to their model, higher adult wage would lead to higher supply of adult labor. and
lower supply of child labor. They assume that because firms perceive adults and children as
substitutes- i.e. substitution axiom-, higher adult wages would lead to lower demand for adult
labor and higher demand for child labor. But, because parents are altruistic, they only send
out their children to work if they are impoverished- have low non-child-labor income. In
8equilibrium, because of the  luxury axiom, child labor would be  less. However, if their
substitution axiom is relaxed and adults and children are complements, higher adult wages
would in turn lead to lower demand for adults and for children. Hence, child labor would also
fall. Thus, theoretically, as long as the luxury axiom holds, higher adult wages would lead to
lower child participation in the labor market.
Both adult male and female wages are used to capture the different impact each may
have on child labor and schooling. Since it is hypothesised by Basu & Van (1998) that adults
and children are substitutes from the firm's point of view, it could be argued that this may be
the case in particular for adults with no education. In other words, that illiterate adults and
children are substitutes." 9 Thus, adult market hourly wages of illiterate male and female by
rural and urban area in every province relative to the national average are used.
Child market hourly wage by rural and urban area in every province relative to the
national average is also included. Child market wage is an important determinant of child
labor. 20 Even when children are unpaid family workers, high child wages would make it
expensive for households to employ children from outside the household, thus requiring their
own children to work. 2'  On the other hand, the effect of child market wage on the probability
of child participating in schooling is an indirect one because it is the opportunity cost of not
working.
3.2 Local Income Inequality:
The second aim of this paper is to test empirically for the role of local income
distribution on the likelihood of child labor.  According to  Swinnerton &  Rogers (1999)
inequality in income distribution contributes to child labor. Thus, one might expect that the
probability of child working is higher in provinces or regions where income is unequally
distributed. To  test this  hypothesis, "Gini"  coefficient is used  as a  measure  of income
inequality by province.
19 Even if adult males and child labor are complements  (for example,  Levy (1985))  rather  than substitutes,
using  the wage  of illiterates  is still  appropriate.
20 Though  it is not always  statistically  significant.  See,  for example,  Soukfias  (1994)  & Rosenzweig  (1981).
21  If the proportion  of children  working  for wage is small,  then it may be argued that child wage does not
measure  the opportunity  cost of children's  time.  Nonetheless,  child  wage  would  capture  the opportunity  cost of
hiring  paid work  for the family,  if unpaid  child  work  had not been  available.
93.3 Inter-Generational Transmission of Poverty
The third focus of this paper is to  explore the inter-generational transmission of
poverty or low income.  The impact of the parents being child laborers themselves on the
probability of child labor is studied by including two dummies, one for each parent.  One
possible hypothesis is that poverty is perpetuated through child labor. So, a parent who has
been  raised  in  poor  family  where he/she  had  to  work  as  child  himself/herself which
constrained himn/her  ability to invest in schooling and condemned him/her to low wage or
poverty as an adult, will tend to send his/her children to work in turn. On the other hand. it
may be that if the parents were child laborers themselves and had to feel the brunt of child
labor or felt disadvantaged as result of working at an early age, they may be less likely to
send their children to work.
3.3 Child's Characteristics:
Gender and age are important determinants of the probability of schooling and work-
see for example, Chernichovsky (1985). Almost all studies find that males are more likely to
be economically active in the labor market. However, the effect of gender on schooling is
more country-specific  and  cultural dependent. Moreover, studies tend to  find  that older
children are  usually likely  to  participate in  the  labor market  and  less  likely  to  attend
schooling. 22 Thus, gender -male dummy- and age are used as explanatory variables.
3.4 Parents' Characteristics.
Previous empirical studies find ample evidence that parents' education affects child
labor and  school participation decisions- see  for  example, Psacharopoulos &  Arriagada
(1989), and  Grootaert (1998).  Some studies - such  as  Handa (1996)- find that  father's
education affects boys the most and mother's education affects girls the most, while others -
like Canagarajah & Coulombe (1997)- find that fathers' education affects the likelihood of
working, and mother's education influences only the schooling participation. Thus, to capture
the effect of parents'  education four educational dummies are used  for each  parent: no
education (which is the reference group), less than primary, primary, and more than primary
education. Also, the nature of the parents' employment affects the child labor decision. A
See Grootaert  & Kanbur  (1995).
10dummy variable indicating whether the father is employed in the Public sector is included to
capture the impact of father having a stable regular  job.
3.5 Household's Characteristics:
The gender of the head of household is another potentially important determinant of
child labor and  schooling. On one hand,  female-headed households usually have higher
dependency ratio  which  may increase  the  likelihood of  sending  children  out  to  work.
However, female-headed  household may tend to be more rational in intra-household resource
allocation pattern and invest in schooling of their children- see for example, Canagarajah &
Coulombe (1997). So a dummy for female headed household is used. Also, the presence and
number of younger siblings in the household may affect the probability of school and work
participation. The more siblings, the more likely that a child will need to work to generate
income and less likely that a child will go to school. Girls, particularly, are likely to be called
upon to help with looking after the younger siblings. The number of children less than six
years old is used.
Since in the 70s and 80s, Egypt witnessed a huge flow of overseas labor migration on
temporary basis, it seems interesting to control for the presence of any return migrants in the
household who might affect the decisions of child labor and schooling. On the one hand, it
may be the case that return migrants are less credit constrained if they have acquired overseas
savings 23 or they might value investing in education having worked overseas and therefore
would have a positive impact on child schooling and negative influence on child working.
3.6 Demand Side & Regional Characteristics:
Trying  to  capture the  factors that  affect  demand  for  children  employment, the
following variables are used. The first variable is the percentage of adult workers engaged in
manufacturing, in the rural or urban area, in the province. 24 The higher the share of adults in
manufacturing, the less would be the demand for children labor. Secondly, the share of adult
workers employed in Public Sector in the rural/urban area in the province is included. The
23 Although there are data on whether a household has a return migrant or not, there are no data on whether the
return migrant had accumulated  any overseas savings.
11more public sector jobs in a province, the lower will be the demand for children employment.
This is because public sector does not hire individuals less than 15 years old; and second it
may reflect the fact that the labor market is more formalised. Finally, the percent of adults in
non-regular - casual and seasonal - employment in the rural/urban area of the province is also
used. The more non-regular employment in a provincial labor market, the more would be the
demand for children work in  that market.  This variable can also capture the  degree of
informality. Children in urban areas tend to work mainly in the informal sector where labor
market regulations  are not  enforced. In  addition,  regional dummies of  residence of  the
household: Greater Cairo  (reference group), Alexandria and  Canal Cities,  Lower Urban
Upper Urban, Lower Rural and Upper Rural are used to control for the different demand
patterns of labor markets in the labor force participation decision.
One of the limitations of the data set used in this paper is that it does not include any
information on  variables that may affect the demand for schooling, for  example, school
availability, accessibility (distance to  school),  quality of  schooling, cost  of  schooling 25,
among others. Previous studies - for example, Bonnet (1993) and Hanushek & Levy (1993)-
point  to  the  importance of  school accessibility  and  school  quality  in  determining the
schooling participation decision. 26 Thus, regional dummies are used to control for school
availability and quality in the school participation equation. One would expect that in rural
areas because of poor schooling facilities, children would be  less likely to  attend school
compared to in urban areas. In addition, children in the poorer rural areas - the south (Upper
Rural Egypt) - are expected to  have lower probability of going  to  school compared to
children in other rural areas - in the north (Lower Rural Egypt).
4.  Empirical Findings
24  There are 26 govemorates or provinces in Egypt and six geographical regions. All govemorates are
comprised of urban and rural areas -except for 4 govemorates ( Greater Cairo. Giza, Alexandria, and Canal
Cities) which are only urban.
25  Although education is free, parents have to pay  for other direct costs like uniform and books as well as
tuition which is fairly common in Egypt - see Hanushek & Levy (1993) for a discussion on the private cost of
education in Egypt.
26  Bonnet (1993)  argues  that schooling  problems  - such as the inaccessibility  of schools  or the lack of quality
education- contribute to child labor. Hanushek & Levy (1993) find  that school quality is one of the main
reasons behind children dropping out of school in Egypt.
12The bivarite probit results of the determinants of child labor force participation and
schooling participation decisions are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Marginal effects are reported;
they show the increment in the probability relative to the sample mean, corresponding  to the
particular characteristic, relative to the reference group. Table 2 presents the results at the
national level for both urban and rural areas, while Table 3 displays the results for rural areas
only to enable a comparison with earlier studies. Separate estimates for boys and girls are
given since the  factors influencing child  labor and  child  schooling may have different
magnitude or impact that is gender specific. Also, to test for the robustness of the results in
the case of paid child work, the results for the determinants of paid child labor and child
schooling are displayed in Table 4.
First, the impact of market wages is examined. Tables 2 and 3 show a strong negative
relationship between adult illiterate male and female market wages and child participation in
the labor market. The higher the adult male and female provincial wages relative to the
national average, the lower is the probability of child labor. It is also interesting to note that
this negative relationship exists for both boys and girls. In addition, this negative relationship
between adult market  wages and  child labor are also  seen in  rural areas.  This partly
contradicts earlier evidence by Levy (1985) who finds positive relationship between male
wages and child labor, but a negative relationship between female market wages and labor
force participation rates of children in rural Egypt. One possible explanation is that although
males  and  children  are  complements as  he  argues,  illiterate  males  and  children  are
substitutes. Thus, the empirical findings support Basu & Van's (1998) luxury hypothesis. In
addition, the findings also indicate that the higher is the child market wage, the more likely a
child will work.
The influence of adult illiterate male market wage on the probability of schooling is
not only positive and significant, but also has bigger impact than the adult illiterate female
market wage. The higher the provincial male market wage relative to the national average,
the more are the odds of child attending schooling. Adult illiterate female market wages have
positive, but smaller compared to  adult male market wage, impact on the likelihood of
school participation of boys. However, adult female market wage has negative impact on the
schooling decision of girls. The higher the adult female wage, the lower is the probability of
13female school participation. One explanation is that higher female adult wages increases
female labor market  participation outside the household, which  in  tum  may mean that
daughters are needed at home to do household chores instead of the mother. The child
market wage does not seem to have significant effect on the child schooling decision, though
it has the expected negative impact suggesting that the higher the child market wage, the
greater is the opportunity cost of attending schooling. 27 In the case of girls, though, it appears
that the opportunity cost of their schooling is not their own forgone wages, but those of their
mothers (adult females).
Table 5b summarises the influence of adult market wages on the probability of
child participation in the labor force by gender and region. It displays the changes in the
predicted probability of child labor - given in Table 5a Column 2- as a result of a 1 % change
in the provincial adult market wage relative to the national average. A 10% increase in the
male illiterate market wage decreases the probability of child labor by 21.5% for boys and
13.1% for girls, while, a similar rise in female illiterate wage rate, lowers the probability of
child participation in the labor market by 18.5% for boys and 4.3% for girls. In rural areas, a
10% increase in female illiterate wage, decreases the likelihood of child labor by 19.0% for
boys and 7.2% for girls.8 To sum up, adult illiterate market wages seem to (i) have strong
negative influence on the probability of both, paid and unpaid, child work, (ii) have greater
impact in rural areas than in urban areas, (iii) have smaller absolute effect on the probability
of school participation than on child labor. Low wages seem to be the key determinants of
child labor.
Tuming to the second focus of the paper, the effect of income inequality, the results
indicate that living in a province where there is greater local income inequality raises the
probability of child labor. This finding is robust in both urban and rural areas, and for both
genders. Thus, the Egyptian evidence supports the "distribution hypothesis" by Swinnerton
27  Levy (1985) also finds that wage-child effect has the right sign but is not significant.
28  Levy (1985) finds that a 10% increase in fema]e market wage rates reduces employment of children by 27%
for 6-11 years old and by 15% for 12-14 years old, in rural Egypt. However, he finds that an increase in male
wage rates increases  employment of children, though he does not report the elasticity Rosenzweig (198  1) finds
that in rural India. a  10% increase in male wages reduces boys' labor supply by 10%, but have no effect on
girls, while a  10% increase in female wages decreases girls' participation in the labor market by 9-10 %, but
have no effect on boys' employment.
14and Rogers (1999) of the existence of a positive relationship between income inequality and
child labor.
The third main finding of the paper is that having a parent who was child laborer
himself/herself increases the probability of the child working. In addition, the effect of the
mother being child laborer is twice as much of that of the father in both rural and urban areas
as well as for girls and boys. This seems to suggest another channel whereby impoverishment
is transmitted from parents to children; child labor perpetuates poverty. However, having a
parent who  worked as  a  child  laborer himself/herself does not  affect  significantly the
likelihood of child participation in schooling.
Gender seems to  be an important deterninant  of both child labor and  schooling.
Being a boy increases both the probability of participation in both the labor market and in
schooling. Being a boy increases the likelihood of working in rural areas by 6%. However,
being a boy has smaller impact on school participation in urban areas, while in rural areas it
increases the likelihood of schooling by 6%.  Age also affects the likelihood of child labor
and schooling. Being older increases the probability of participating in the labor force and
decreases that of attending schooling.
Parents'  characteristics play  an  important role  in  influencing the  working  and
schooling decisions of children. Having  a  father who is employed in  the  Public sector
increases the  probability of  the  child  attending school  and  decreases that  of  working.
Moreover, having less educated parents increase the likelihood of child labor and decreases
that of investing in schooling. As found in earlier studies father's education affect boys more
than mother's education which affects girls more.
Household characteristics affect  the  determinants  of  child  labor  and  schooling.
Living  in  a  household  where  the  head  is  female  does  not  affect  the  probability  of
participating in the labor market, but it increases the likelihood of investing in schooling.
Having younger siblings at the household increases the odds of child labor and decreases that
of schooling. The presence of return overseas migrants at the household has negative (though
not always significant) effect on the likelihood of child work. However, having a return
overseas migrant has positive impact on the schooling decision. This would suggest that
return migrants tend to invest in education.
15The characteristics of the  local  labor market  seem to  have more  impact on the
probability of child  labor in  rural areas than  in urban  ones. Though local  labor market
characteristics affect the probability of paid child labor in both urban and rural areas. Thus,
the higher the share of adults engaged in manufacturing, the lower is the probability of child
participation in the labor market, though it is more  significant for girls than boys. In other
words, the  share of adults engaged in  manufacturing has negative, though  insignificant,
impact on boys work. Also, the share of adults employed in the public sector in the local
labor market has strong negative impact on child labor for both genders. The percentage of
adults  engaged  in  non-regular employment has  a  positive  significant influence on  the
likelihood of paid child labor.  Those last two variables capture the degree of informality in
the local labor market and suggest that the more informality the more likely children would
participate in  the labor market. To  sumn  up,  local labor market  conditions are important
determinants of demand for child labor.
Finally, the estimation technique adopted enable us to test for the interdependencies
of the two decisions at hand.  The correlation coefficient  p  is negative and significant in all
estimations indicating that there  is a  trade off  between child labor and  child schooling
choices. This trade-off is bigger in urban areas and for males.
5.  Conclusion
Understanding the  main  determinants of  child  labor is  essential  for  formulating
effective policies in tackling child labor.  Using individual level data from Egypt, the joint
determinants of child labor and child schooling have been studied. The main findings of the
paper  are the  following. Market adult  wages  have a  strong negative  influence on  the
probability of child labor - which provides support for Basu & Van (1998). A 10% increase
in the illiterate male market wage decreases the probability of child labor by 21.5% for boys
and 13.1% for girls, while, a similar rise in illiterate female wage rate, lowers the probability
of child participation in the labor market by 18.5% for boys and 4.3% for girls. Also, higher
local income inequality in  a province/ region increases the  likelihood of  child labor as
conjectured by Swinnerton & Rogers (1999). In addition, parents who were child laborers
themselves are more likely to send their children out to work. Thus, not only is poverty the
16main cause of child labor, but the results indicate that child labor itself helps to perpetuate
poverty as well.
The  findings  also  indicate  that  local  labor  market  conditions  are  important
determinants of child labor. The higher the share of adults emiployed  in the public sector  jobs
in the local labor market, the lower would be the likelihood of child labor. The higher the
proportion of adults engaged in non-regular employment in the local labor market, the higher
are the odds of child labor market participation. In addition, household characteristics play an
important role in influencing both child labor and child schooling. The results also suggest
that there is a trade off between child labor and child schooling.
Several policy  implications emerge from this paper. Policies aimed at  alleviating
poverty and reducing income inequality seem to  be  crucial in tackling child  labor and
breaking the cycle of poverty transmission form one generation to the next. Improving adult
employment, in particular creating more  formal sector jobs  would be another important
policy recommendation.
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19Table  l a: Descriptive Statistics
Total  School  1  Non-School  LF  LF Participants  Non -LF
Sample  Participants  |  Participants  Participants  Participants
Paid LFP  Unpaid
LFP  .-
Age  (%)  _  6_  _  ._ _  _  _7  48.88  42_21
6-11  1  66.42  70.11  1  48.88  42.21  J  32.79  46.27  72.09
12-14  _  33.58  29.89  51.12  57.79  67.21  53.73  27.91
(Gender  (%)
Male  |  51.02  55.34  30.38  61.38  |  76.45  54.89  48.60
Female{  48.98  j  44.66  69.62  |38.62  23.55  45.11  {  51.40
Educational  Level (%)
None  10.69  ----  60.45  30.89  35.54  28.85  6.32
Read & write  73.50  81.92  35.72  48.23  40.83  51.48  79.06
Primary  15.81  18.08  3.83  20.88  23.64  19.67  14.62
Region (%)  ___  ___
Greater Cairo  20.12  22.87  7.24  6.72  15.77  2.82  23.26
Alex & Canal Cities  7.74  8.63  3.64  2.06  3.31  1.52  9.08
Lower Urban  8.60  9.73  3.35  5.33  8.51  3.96  9.37
Upper Urban  4.26  4.65  2.33  1.59  2.16  1.34  4.89
Lower Rural  32.19  31.06  37.58  51.76  37.04  58.09  27.61
UJpper  Rural  _  27.08  23.05  45.87  32.55  33.21  32.27  |  25.79
Father 's Characterislics
Father was Child Laborcr (%O)  41.8  38.2  51.47  57.5(  44.63  63.04  |  37.23
Public SectorFmnployee(%)  31.94  _ 3593  13.16  17.20  18.07|  16.83  |  35.39
20Table la: Descriptive  Statistics (Continued)
Total  |  School  Non-School  LF  LF Participants  Non -LF
Sample  [  Participants  Participants  Participants  Participants
Paid LFP  Unpaid
.________  LFP
PFather  's Education  (%):
Illiterate  42.18  36.04  70.69  56.57  58.08  55.92  38.80
Lcss than Primary  23.60  25.43  15.30  23.03  18.18  25.12  23.73
Primary  8.61  9.85  2.74  4.85  4.86  4.85  9.49
More than Primary  25.61  28.68  11.27  15.55  18.88  14.11  27.98
Mother''s  Characteristics
Mother was Child Laborer(%)  18.63  17.31  25.66  41.60  25.12  48.81  13.42
Mother 's Education (%):
Illiterate  75.29  71.20  94.49  89.93  87.87  90.82  71.86
Less than Primary  9.11  10.39  3.07  5.39  5.27  5.44  9.99
Primary  5.32  6.34  0.54  2.22  3.22  1.79  6.05
More than Primary  10.28  12.07  1.90  2.46  3.64  1.95  12.10
hlousehold's  Characteristics
Female Headed Household (%)  11.90  12.14  10.80  12.65  16.64  10.93  11.72
Mean number of children < 6 years  1.25  1.19  1.56  1.38  1.21  1.45  1.22
old
HI-I  with overseas return migrants (%)  17.28  17.80  13.92  15.98  16.08  15.94  17.58
21Table  la: Descrip)tive Statistics  (Continuedl)
Total  School  Non-School  LF  LF Participants  Non -LF
Sample  Participants  Participants  Participants  Participants
Paid LFP  Unpaid
L_  }  XLFP
Inlustry  (%)
Agriculture  74.13  36.84  88.81
Manufacturing  11.00  33.33  2.21
Construction  1.78  5.96  7.46
'T'rade  7.04  5.96  0.28
Services  5.05  15.44  0.97
Occupation (%)
Sales Workers  6.34  4.91  6.91
Services Workers  I  )1.00  2.11  0.55
AgricuLitural  Workers  - 74.13  36.84  88.81
Productioni  Workers  18.43  56.14  3.59
Sample Size (N)  10742  9043  1699  1988  605  1383  8754
'I'otal Sample (%)  100  82.54  17.46  18.99  5.71  13.28  81.01
22Table I  b: Joint Participation of Children in Working and Studying
Not Studying  Studying  Total
Not Working  85  7902  8754
9.73  90.27  100
50.15  87.38  81.49
Working  847  1141  1988
42.61  57.39  100
49.85  12.62  18.51
Total  1699  9043  10742
15.8  84.18  100
100  100  100
Note: The top italic figure in each entry is the absolute number; the second figure is the % of
the row; the third figure is the % of the column.
Table lc:  Labor Force and Schooling Participation Rate of Children 6-14 years old  (%o)
Working &  Working  Studying  Neither  Total
Studying  Only  Only
Total Sample  10.63  7.88  73.56  7.93  100
Gender
Boys  15.11  7.06  75.14  2.69  100
Girls  5.97  8.74  71.93  13.36  100
Region
Urban  5.02  3.29  87.58  4.12  100
Rural  16.38  12.61  59.16  11.85  100
Age Group
6-11 years old  7.92  3.97  80.76  7.34  100
12-14 years old  15.93  15.58  59.40  9.09  100
23Table 2:  Determinants of Labor Force Participation & School Participation: Rural &
Urban Areas (Marginal Effects)
Variable  Total Sample  Boys  Girls
Work  School  Work  School  Workl  School
-0.608  0.068  -0.841  0.098  -0.3)  0.046
Constant  (11.69)  (16.33)  (9.03)  (11.57)  (6.42)  (14.62)
Market Wages
Log Male wages  -0.143  0.018  -0.148  0.018  -0.117  0.014
(7.05)  (4.00)  (4.20)  (2.21)  (5.22)  (3.77)
Log Female wages  -0.079  -0.002  -0.127  0.005  -0.038  -0.004
_  (8.69)  (0.88)  (7.72)  (1.33)  (4.46')  (2.44)
Log Child wages  0.063  -0.003  0.070  -0.007  0.050  -0.001
(5.21)  (0.94)  (3.19)  (1.22)  (4.41)  (0.58)
Local Income Inequality
Income Inequality  (Gini)  |  0.004  |  - (30.004  _  ---  0.003___---
(5.97)  (3.85)  (4.58)j
Parents Being Child Laborers
Father was Child Laborer  T0.039  1-0.000  0.054  0.001  0.024  -0.001
(6.50)  (0.21)  (4.91)  (0.28)  (4.28)  (0.69)
Mother was Child Laborer  0.080  0.001  0.098  -0.001  0.056  0.001
_  (13.09)  (0.81)  (8.37)  (0.44)  (10.28)  (0.69)
Child Characteristics
Male  0.061  0.022  ---
_  (11.30)  (17.95)
Age  0.034  -0.004  0.052  -0.005  0.019  -0.003
(28.49)  (18.59)  (23.16)  (11.61)  (16.44)  (14.86)
Father's Characteristics
Employed in Public Sector  -0.047  0.013  -0.057  0.015  -0.034  0.009
_______________________  6(6.76)  (8.02)  (4.53)  (4.41)  (4.85)  (7.15)
Education  (refP. illiterate)  _
Less than Primary  v  -0.019  0.018  -0.026  0.021  -0.0131  0.012
(2.91)  (11.91)  (2.18)  (6.67)  (3.06)  (10.04)
Primarv  -0.048  0.024  -0.075  0.027  ----  ----
(4.08)  (8.33)  (3.60)  (4.70)  _  _
More than Primary  -0.035  0.040  -0.089  0.040  ----  ----
(2.61)  (8.97)  (3.55)  (4.90)  _  _  _
Primary & more  -0.073  0.040
(3.82)  (9.29)
24Table 2: Determinants of Labor Force Participation & School Participation: Rural &
Urban Areas (Marginal  Effects) - (Continued)
Mother's Education (ref: illiterate)
Less than Primary  -0.037  0.013  -0.030  0.009  -0.034  0.010
(3.52)  (5.13)  (1.67)  (1.83)  (3.06)  (4.89)
Primary  -0.051  0.023  -0.030  0.009
(3.01)  (5.14)  (1.08)  (1.16)
More than Primary'  -0.080  0.030  -0.068  0.025
(4.32)  (4.56)  (2.31)  (2.30)
Primary  or more  ----  ----  ----  ----  -0.034  0.040
(3.82)  (3.08)
Household Characteristics
Female head  -0.001  0.016  -0.021  0.019  0.010  0.011
(0.14)  (8.04)  (1.25)  (4.49)  (1.13)  (7.06)
Number of children less  0.011  -0.004  0.014  -0.003  0.007  -0.003
than 6 years old  (4.45)  (6.72)  (3.27)  (2.21)  (2.99)  (7.03)
Overseas Return Migrant  -0.012  0.012  -0.023  0.011  -0.004  0.006
(dummy=l)  (1.55)  (5.21)  (1.72)  (3.09)  (0.60)  (4.42)
Regional Characteristics
Adults engaged  in  -0.002  ---  -0.0002  ---  -0.003
Manufacturing  (%)  (2.66)  (0.20)  (3.53)
Adults employed  in Public  -0.004  ---  -0.003  -0.003
Sector (%)  (5.41)  (3.02)  (3.89)
Adults engaged  in non-  0.001  ---  0.002  ---  -0.0003
regular employment  (%)  (1.13)  (1.41)  (0.38)
Region  (ref:: G. Cairo)
Alex & Canal Cities  0.003  -0.007  0.003  -0.007  0.026  -0.007
(0.16)  (2.06)  (0.83)  (0.56)  (1.38)  (2.79)
Lower Urban  0.023  -0.002  0.023  -0.002  0.005  0.003
(1.77)  (0.52)  (2.43)  (1.51)  (0.33)  (1.02)
Upper Urban  -0.061  -0.001  -0.061  -0.001  -0.034  -0.002
(3.72)  (0.27)  (2.99)  (0.43)  (1.76)  (0.87)
Lower Rural  0.069  -0.015  0.069  -0.015  0.053  -0.014
(2.99)  (5.43)  (2.04)  (1.38)  (2.29)  (6.19)
Upper Rural  0.039  -0.026  0.039  -0.026  0.039  -0.024
(1.39)  (9.75)  (0.76)  (2.15)  (1.43)  (11.19)
A  -0.58 (31.46)  -0.64 (24.61)  -0.51 (16.99)
Sample size  10742  5466  5276
Log likelihood  -6918.60  -3422.40  -3361.70
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. A is coefficient of correlation between the
two equations.
25Table 3:  Determinants of Labor Force Participation & School Participation: Rural Areas
Only (Marginal Effects)
Variable  Total Sample  Boys  Girls
Work  School  Work  School  Work  School
Constant  -0.981  0.137  -1.219  0. 153|  -0.654  0.147
(13.43)  (12.04)  (10.25)  (7.72)  (7.99)  (10.48)
M'iarket  Wages
Log Male wages  -0.306  0.046  -0.294  f  0.040  -0.325  0.055
(6.39)  (4.19)  (3.90)  (2.63)  (4.67)  (3.76)
Log Female wages  -0.168  -0.004  -0.223  0.009  -0.108  -0.014
(9.25)  (0.90)  (7.72)  (1.70)  (4.93)  (2.76)
Log Child wages  0.114  -0.002  0.093  -0.005  0.118  -0.002
(4.03)  (0.32)  (2.07)  (0.49)  (3.68)  (0.25)
Local Income Inequality
Income  Inequality  (Gini)  0.008  0.009  0.006
(5.41)  (5.41)  (3.83)
Parents Being Child Laborers
Father was Child Laborer  0.073  -0.006  0.096  -0.006  0.053  -0.005
.______________________  (5.65)  (1.64)  (4.53)  (1.13)  (3.70)  (1.20)
Mother was Child Laborer  0.128  0.006  0.153  -0.0001  0.099  0.009
(10.38)  (1.82)  (7.66)  (0.02)  (7.10)  (2.17)
Child Characteristics
Male  0.060  0.062  ----  ----  ----
______________________  _ }  (5.31)  (20.27)  _  _  _  _  _
Age  0.062  -0.008  0.079  -0.006  0.044  -0.009
_______________________  1(24.76)  j  (14.07)  (10.25)  (7.72)  (15.51)  (11.40)
Father's Characteristics
Employed in Public Sector  -0.110  0.036  -0.122  0.028  -0.089  0.037
(6.95)  (8.49)  (4.80)  (4.32)  (4.88)  (7.16)
Illiterate  0.035  -0.043  0.029  -0.031  0.037  -0.047
______________________  }(2.56)  (11.96)  (1.29)  (5.64)  (2.47)  (10.81)
Mother's Characteristics
Illiterate  0.0371  -0.023  |  0.035  |  -0.004  1 0.036  -0.047
I______________________  j(1.87)  L  (4.17)  (1.08)  (0.56)  J  (1.54)  (4.76)
26Table 3:  Determinants of Labor Force Participation & School Participation: Rural Areas
Only (Marginal Effects)  - (Continued)
Household Characteristics
Female head  0.035  -0.007  -0.006  -0.008  0.064  -0.006
(1.60)  (1.24)  (0.16)  (0.90)  (2.55)  (0.80)
Number of children less  0.008  -0.006  0.006  -0.002  0.009  -0.008
than 6 years old  (1.58)  (4.38)  (0.67)  (0.86)  (1.48)  (5.06)
Overseas Return Migrant  T  0.029  1  0.022  -0.062  f  0.022  -0.006  0.018
(dummy=l)  {  (1.77) J  (5.15)  (2.37)  (3.40)  J (0.31)  (3.58)
Regional Characteristics
Adults  engaged in  -0.005  ---  -0.002  ---  -0.009
Manufacturing (%)  (4.16)  (1.24)  (3.72)
Adults  employed  in Public  -0.011  ---  -0.011  ---  -0.008
Sector (%)  (6.05)  (4.03)  (3.31)
Adults engaged  in non-  0  ---  0.001  ---  -0.002
regular employment  (%) (0.02)  (0.57)  (0.98)
Region  (ref:  G. Cairo)
Lower Rural  0.054  1 0.025  0.054  0.008  0.046  1 0.034
(2.88) J (6.91)  (1.83)  j  (1.47)  (2.04)  (7.86)
A  -0.53 (21.84)  -0.56 (14.47)  -0.51 (15.38)
Sample size  5299  2674  2625
Log likelihood  -4695.91  -2158.51  -2483.36
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. A is coefficient of correlation between the
two equations.
27Table 4: Determinants of  Paid Labor Force Participation & School Participation: Rural
& Urban Areas (Marginal Effects)
Variable  Total Sample  Boys  Girls
Paid  School  Paid  School  Paid  School
Work  Work  Work
Constant  -0.170  0.018  -0.308  0.038  -0.054  0.005
(8.43)  (16.18)  (6.76)  (11.45)  (3.52)  (14.40)
Market  Wages
Log Male wages  -0.044  0.005  -0.074  0.009  -0.018  0.002
(5.45)  (4.64)  (4.25)  (2.85)  (2.75)  (4.04)
Log Female wages  1  -0.017  -0.0003  -0.036  0.002  -0.001  -0.0003
(4.83)  (0.71)  (4.67)  (1.70)  (0.50)  (2.31)
Log Child wages  0.029  -0.001  0.042  -0.003  0.002  -0.0001
(6.48)  - (0.80)  (4.51)  (1.14)  (3.88i  (0.52)
Local Income  Inequality
Income  Inequality  (Gini)  0.001  0.002  - 0.001
(4.08)  (3.36)  (2.59'.
Parents  Being Child  Laborers
Father was Child Laborer  -0.002  0  -0.004  0.0006  -0.0004  0
(0.88)  (0.10)  (0.79)  (0.61)  (0.25)  (0.46)
Mother was Child Laborer  -0.001  0.0004  -0.004  -0.0001  - 0.0006  0.0001
(0.49)  (0.99)  (0.73)  (0.10)  (0.38)  (1.10)
Child Characteristics
Male  0.025  0.006  ---  ---  ---
(11.40)  (17.92)  _  _  _  _
Age  0.007  -0.001  0.016  -0.002  0.002  -0.0003
_________________________  (15.33)  (18.81)  (14.87)  (12.28)  (4.48)  (14.78)
Father's  Characteristics
Employed in Public Sector  -0.003  0.0031  -0.003  0.006  -0.003  0.001
Education  (ref:  illiterate,)  (1.11)  (8.10)  (0.48)  (4.51)  (1.11)  l  (6.76)
|Education  (ref:. illiterate)| 
Less than Primary  -0.011  0.005  -0.019  0.009  -0.005  0.001
(4.27)  (12.20)  (3.39)  (7.00)  (2.09)  (10.24)
Primary  -0.019  0.006  -0.032  0.011  ---  0.001
(4.00)  (8.31)  (3.29)  (4.88)  (6.81)
More than  Primarv  -0.022  0.010  -0.049  0.015  ----  0.003
Primary  or more  (3.59)  i  (8.66)  (3.78)  (4.86)  -.  1  (5.96)
Primarv or more  I  -----  --  ----  ----  -0.011  ----
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  (2 .3  9  )
28Table 4: Determinants of Paid Labor Force Participation & School Participation: Rural
& Urban Areas (Marginal Effects) - (Continued)
Mother's  Education  (ref:  illiterate)
Less than Primary  -0.010  0.003  -0.017.  0.004  -0.004  0.001
(2.49)  (5.17)  (1.84)  (1.78)  (1.04)  (4.87)
Primary  -0.008  0.006  -0.007  0.003
(1.30)  (5.05)  (0.58)  (1.19)
More than Primary  -0.020  0.008  -0.029  0.010
(2.36)  (4.75)  (1.75)  (2.35)
Primary  or more  ----  ----  ----  ----  -0.010  0.004
(1.29)  (3.59)
Household's Characteristics
Female head  -0.001  0.001  -0.003  0.007  0.001  0.001
(0.40)  (7.95)  (0.38)  (4.56)  (0.38)  (6.38)
Number of children less  -0.0003  -0.001  0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.0003
than 6 years old  (0.26)  (6.78)  (1.42)  (2.31)  (2.28)  (7.06)
Overseas Return Migrant  -0.001  0.002  0.002  0.004  -0.003  0.001
(dummy=l)  (0.26)  (5.05)  (0.33)  (3.14)  (1.42)  (3.93)
Regional Characteristics
Adults engaged  in  0.001  ---  0.002
Manufacturing (%)  (3.53)  (3.65)
Adults employed  in Public  -0.001  ---  -0.002  ---  -0.001
Sector (%)  (4.35)  (3.43)  (2.10)
Adults engaged  in non-  0.001  ---  0.002  0.0004
regular employment  (%)  (3.88)  (2.81)  (1.63)
Region (ref: G. Cairo)
Alex & Canal Cities  -0.002  -0.002  -0.014  -0.001  0.009  -0.001
(0.41)  (2.04)  (1.10)  (0.50)  (1.57)  (2.80)
Lower Urban  0.006  0  0.013  -0.002  0.006  0.0003
(1.18)  (0.06)  (1.34)  (1.04)  (1.28)  (1.33)
Upper Urban  -0.015  0  -0.027  0.002  -0.002  -0.0002
(2.36)  (0.02)  (2.10)  (0.81)  (0.35)  (0.72)
Lower Rural  0.001  -0.004  -0.016  -0.002  0.016  -0.001
(0.12)  (5.10)  (0.78)  (0.87)  (1.75)  (5.94)
Upper Rural  -0.002  -0.007  -0.013  -0.003  0.012  -0.002
(0.21)  (9.37)  (0.49)  (1.67)  (1.16)  (10.82)
A  -0.51(20.20)  -0.59 (18.94)  -0.34 (5.42)
Sample size  10742  5466  5276
Log likelihood  -5242.35  -2636.60  -2445.93
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.
29Table 5a: Predicted Probabilities of Child Labor and Child Schooling (%)
Working & Studying  Working Only  Studying Only
Total Sample (Urban & Rural Areas)
Bovs  15.44  6.87  74.46
Girls  5.68  8.94  72.53
Rural Areas
Boys  23.14  11.72  !  60.44
Girls  8.75  L  15.00  58.65
Urban Areas
Boys  f  8.06  f  2.23  87.90
Girls  2.64  L  2.95  86.27
Table 5b: The Effect ofAdult Market Wages on the Predicted Probability'  of Child Working
(So,)  I
Boys  Girls
Total Sample (Urban & Rural)
Male Market Wages  2.15  1.31
Female Market Wages  1.85  L  0.43
Rural Areas
Male Market Wages  2.51  2.17
Female Market Wages  1.90  0.72
Urban  Areas
Male Market Wages  1.88  1.36
Female Market Wages  |  1.75  j  0.41
'The absolute change in the predicted probability of child working as a result of a I % change
in provincial market adult wage  relative to the national average.
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